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Abstract 
 
The core aim of Mark Latham‟s Third Way-style policy proposals is to 
promote the revivification of civil society as part of the renewed 
pursuit of the common good.  I critically examine this core aim with 
reference to Mark Latham‟s proposed changes to income support.  I 
claim that Latham's tendency to focus on disadvantaged 
communities as sites of normative dysfunction only reinforces the 
traditional conceptual division between deserving employed citizens 
and undeserving income recipients. It also neglects the real 
difficulties experienced by mainstream communities, such as the 
growing time deficit in working households.  I conclude that Latham 
misses a real opportunity to re-legitimise collective provision and 
revive the social sphere using a universal rather than a residual 
policy perspective that shows concern for the well-being of all 
Australian citizens.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Third Way theory promotes increased civic participation as a way of 
pursuing a reinvigorated social justice agenda that steers a middle 
path between social democracy and economic fundamentalism 
(Giddens 1998:128, 164).  In the Australian context, Third Way 
advocate Mark Latham prescribes a re-configuration of civic rights 
and responsibilities using a communitarian model of state funded, 
community-based services.  His intention is to encourage civic 
participation, thereby providing renewed legitimacy for the idea of 
collective provision.  Because of the Third Way preference for policy 
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proposals that focus on governance models and civic relationships 
over structural causes of inequality, critics have referred to it as 
Thatcherism with a happy face (Scanlon 1999:25), or as a clever 
repackaging of the status quo (Edelman 1999: 3).  Indeed, in 
Australia, Rob Watts (2000: 159) suggests that Mark Latham‟s 
interpretation of Third Way theory is actually a reworking of the 
1980s Hawke-Keating Labor Government „active society‟ policy 
framework on which recent contractual unemployment policies such 
as Mutual Obligation are based.  While I agree with these criticisms, I 
would argue that Latham‟s aim of achieving civic renewal is 
important, particularly as a way of renewing collectivism for the 
pursuit of social justice and individual well-being.  Nonetheless, While 
Latham intends, laudably, to encourage civic participation and 
provide renewed legitimacy for the idea of collective provision, his 
model fails to promote such participation for a broad range of 
citizens.     
 
There are several relevant key components of Third Way theory.  
Latham and British Third Way advocate Anthony Giddens focus on 
the potential of community and civic responsibility as ideal 
mechanisms for the pursuit of the common good in a globalised 
world.  From this perspective, three elements of Latham‟s policy 
proposal for income support programmes, which are based on his 
interpretation of the Third Way agenda, require some analysis.  
Firstly, the new social contract, which underpins Latham‟s suggested 
income support proposals, will not revitalise collectivism as he hopes 
since it tends to reproduce existing social divisions that undermine 
the basis for collective provision.  Secondly, these divisions are 
echoed in his interpretation of social capital, where affluence and 
civic activity are contrasted with poverty and civic inactivity.  Indeed, 
the tendency of both Latham and Giddens to conflate work with civic 
activity ensures that the good civic behaviour of employed, middle-
class citizens is largely taken for granted.  Finally, this theoretical 
oversight tends to ignore a significant barrier to civic participation 
faced by employed, affluent citizens: that of excessive working hours.  
I conclude that in order to bring about civic renewal and revive 
collectivism, Latham must pursue universal policies that aim to 
enhance the well-being of all citizens.       
 
 
Third Way 
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As a political theory the Third Way can be largely attributed to 
Anthony Giddens, the progenitor of Latham‟s work.  According to 
Giddens, the continued dominance of the economic sphere, 
combined with the waning power of the nation state in a globalised 
world, requires a re-configuration of civic rights and responsibilities of 
both the state and its citizens.  Consequently, „the overall aim of third 
way politics should be to help citizens pilot their way through the 
major revolutions of our time: globalisation, transformations in 
personal life and our relationship to nature‟ (Giddens in Conlan 
1998). 
 
The Third Way is conceived as a method of steering government 
policy between the two poles of interventionist social democratic 
governance and the hands-off laissez-faire approach often 
associated with globalisation.  Third Way theory prescribes a form of 
state intervention that emphasises the devolution of government (to a 
community level) and the revitalisation of the civic sphere as 
preferred ways of mitigating the worst effects of a globalised market.  
This approach is contrasted with what Giddens regards as outmoded 
top-down programs that „engineer‟ equality through the redistribution 
of social and economic goods.  Instead, Third Way theorists propose 
policies that enable communities to improve their economic and 
social well-being through increased civic and democratic 
engagement (with devolved state services and community groups).  
According to Giddens (1998:110), the localisation of governance 
must occur through a combination of government and non-
government provision.  As a part of their increased civic activity 
citizens must also become more responsible for the consequences of 
their actions.  This is because, as a consequence of globalisation, 
the nation state is less able to intervene actively on behalf of its 
citizens.  Giddens frames this new social contract in terms of 
encouraging individuals to take unspecified risks: „In more actively 
restructured institutions, you often want to encourage people to take 
risks, rather than stopping them from doing so‟ (1999: 5). 
 
 
Collectivism and Latham’s New Social Contract 
 
For Latham too, an emphasis on civic responsibility underwrites the 
new social contract between the „modernised‟ state and its citizens.  
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He asserts that civic responsibility is one of the informal rules of 
society: „the obligations people work out among themselves without 
interference from government or economics‟ (Latham 2000:9).  From 
this perspective, traditional centralised models of social provision are 
seen as inherently undesirable since, Latham (2001b) claims, they 
encourage „passivity‟ and „dependency‟, particularly amongst 
recipients of income support.2  More significant for this paper is his 
claim that traditional models of income support also weaken the 
collective impulse. 
 
Latham (1997: 1-2) believes that a new contract is required because 
increased social and economic expectations, the erosion of 
traditional values, demographic change and scarce state resources 
have all served to weaken collectivism.   He argues that recent 
economic and social restructuring has produced a 30/40/30 society.  
The top 30 per cent of citizens have competitive skills, high 
productivity and growing incomes, the middle 40 percent have jobs 
but no security, and the bottom 30 per cent are outside of the 
production process: „the unemployed, the chronically ill, and elderly‟ 
(Latham 1997:4).  Latham claims that the instability of the present 
social contract comes from insecure 40 per cent of middle income 
earners who resent the guaranteed income, which the bottom 30 per 
cent of citizens receive from the state.  Rather than keeping to the 
traditional view of capital versus labour he argues that employed, 
middle-class Australians now express „downward envy‟, where 
welfare recipients rather than wealthy Australians are held 
responsible for an increasing sense of economic precariousness 
(1997:4).  Tony Eardley and George Matheson confirm that „by 
international standards, Australians appear to take a relatively hard 
line on the responsibilities of unemployed people‟ (2000: 99).  Aside 
from a growing sense of economic insecurity, Latham‟s analysis 
suggests that this middle-class resentment stems from a perception 
that they are eternal contributors to the welfare state.   From this  
perspective, in order to build a new sense of legitimacy for state 
provision, middle-class Australians must be reassured that 
institutional arrangements are not being abused.  
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Latham (1997:12) claims that current institutions of social provision 
do not create „behavioural visibility for stakeholders to the commons‟ 
so that citizens are forced to rely on information presented in the 
mass media, which feeds their perception that „free riders‟ are 
endemic.   He suggests, therefore, that social provision should be 
devolved to a local level and handed over to a state-funded 
community network of Non-government Organisations (NGOs).  He 
claims that this provisional structure will encourage self-governance, 
which by extension, „forces citizens to take and manage risks in the 
realisation of their needs and interests‟.  As an added advantage, 
however, using this structure will also make recipients more visible 
and enable citizens and social entrepreneurs to more easily spot 
„free riders‟ and take appropriate action (Latham 1998: 302-303).  
Thus, the locus of centralised coercion and surveillance is transferred 
from the state to the community.  This institutional design is intended 
to reassure middle-class stakeholders by giving them a direct hand in 
running institutions of collective provision.  
 
 
 
Yet the realities of implementing such a policy remain unclear.  By 
„citizens‟ does Latham mean those already employed by NGO, 
advocacy and charitable institutions, or does he refer to citizens in 
the more general sense of the term?  If citizens and „social 
entrepreneurs‟ are those already working in non-government welfare 
organisations then Latham‟s proposals merely represent an extended 
charity model, with government providing a greater percentage of 
funding.  At first glance, Latham‟s definition of social entrepreneurs 
seems to confirm this interpretation:  
social entrepreneurs come from a range of backgrounds, such 
as churches, welfare agencies and community organisations.  
They can also emerge from the public sector—middle 
managers that have been liberated from the bureaucratic rules 
and methods of government (Latham www.thirdway-
aust/com). 
 
Catherine McDonald and Greg Marston (2002: 6) agree with this 
interpretation, suggesting that within communitarian theories such as 
the Third Way, „the community sector is positioned as the ideal site 
for meeting social need and constructing ideal citizens, while the 
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state accepts an increasingly residual function‟ (McDonald & Marston 
2002: 6). 
 
If community groups and social entrepreneurs are to take over the 
administration of welfare programs then it is difficult to position 
ordinary, employed citizens within the Third Way concept of „active 
citizenship‟.  Latham (2001a:9) does appear to endorse active 
citizenship in his vague directive that „people shouldn‟t be 
campaigning for better services, they should be running them‟.  
However, if he does intend for all citizens to become more active in 
the civil sphere, then two problems immediately present themselves.  
First, how will fully employed citizens find the time to realise their 
needs and interests at a community level?  It is difficult to see how 
replacing state provision with a community network model will 
achieve this.  Research shows that „expressive‟ forms of civic activity 
(including artistic expression, advocacy, quality of life issues and 
political mobilisation) are higher where the state adequately meets 
the basic needs of its citizens (Salamon & Sokolowski 2001: 15-18).  
Based on this interpretation of civic activity, devolving essential 
services for disadvantaged groups does nothing substantial to 
enhance the civic health and well-being of the wider community.  In 
fact, based on an  „active citizen‟ interpretation of Latham‟s policy 
proposal, making the community responsible for the provision of 
basic services may put more time pressure on already overworked 
citizens.   In any case, Latham‟s idea that the appeasement of 
relatively affluent, employed Australians could be achieved by 
devolving coercive income support systems to a community level is 
debatable.  This strategy is based on his assumption that the 
traditional Australian welfare system demanded no obligations of its 
recipients.  However, since the extension of welfare provisions after 
1941, those outside the labour force who have been offered a 
minimal, means-tested „safety net‟. Unemployment benefits, in 
particular, have always been targeted at the poorest citizens and 
have always required some form of work test (Tulloch 1979: 47).   
 
More significant for the decline of collectivism is the tendency of the 
Australian system of social provision to represent generic „welfare‟ as 
cash transfers only; a concept that encourages working citizens to 
conceive of themselves as perpetual contributors who do not benefit 
from collective modes of provision.  This is despite the existence of 
universal welfare programmes such as health and education, as well 
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as tax-based welfare such as rebates.  Conversely, income support 
recipients tend to be stigmatised as the highly visible recipients of 
public largesse (Baume 1995: 196-204; Quiggin 1997).  There is no 
indication that Latham‟s proposed policies will do anything to change 
this dynamic.  In fact, it could be argued that community-based 
income support will actually heighten the visibility of recipients within 
their own communities.  While visibility need not have negative 
ramifications for target citizens of policy changes, Latham‟s 
assumption that the management of „free-riders‟ is a primary function 
of welfare systems will ensure that the coercive logic of current 
modes of state-based income support prevails.   
 
As a consequence, Latham reinforces the largely artificial distinction 
between „independent‟ workers and „dependent‟ welfare recipients 
already reflected in current Australian welfare discourse. This 
dichotomy is reflected in Latham‟s assertion that „the large, 
centralised bureaucracies of the welfare state appear to be out-of-
step with an increasingly self-reliant electorate‟ (Latham 1997: 3).   
Therefore, Latham‟s argument that collectivism has been 
undermined by an unbalanced philosophy of welfare entitlement 
does not appear to hold.  Instead, the divisive logic reflected in the 
conceptual division of residual and universal areas of social provision 
weakens collectivism and undermines the legitimacy of the welfare 
state.  As Giddens himself argues: 
Only a welfare system that benefits most of the population will 
generate a common morality of citizenship.  Where „welfare‟ 
assumes only a negative connotation, and is targeted largely 
at the poor, as has tended to happen in the US, the results are 
divisive (1998:108). 
 
Latham is concerned about rebuilding the legitimacy of collective 
provision yet he insists: 
In areas where universal benefits can not be demonstrated, 
governments need to contain their activities to safety net 
services designed to enhance the equality and inclusiveness 
of our society.  This means targeting (through income support 
and locational programs) public resources to those instances 
where private resources are not sufficient to provide a decent 
threshhold of social capability (1997: 17). 
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By promoting residual, targeted welfare programs Latham ignores 
the potentially detrimental effects of this strategy on public support 
for such services.  In addition, continuing to target only the most 
vulnerable also has potentially negative ramifications for the well-
being of other citizens since more pressure will be placed on families 
and communities to shoulder the burden of collective welfare.  
Latham‟s preference for residual income support and community-
based programs also takes the civic capacity of employed, middle-
class Australians for granted, representing them as self-reliant, 
perpetual contributors to the commons. 
 
 
Social Capital and Employed, Middle-class Citizens 
 
The social and economic effects of globalisation on the habits and 
civic complexion of employed, middle-class Australians are curiously 
absent in the work of both Giddens and Latham.  This is probably 
because, in Third Way theory, formal employment appears to provide 
the behavioural template for civic flourishing.  Giddens argues of 
Britain that because „we live in a much more active society, we 
require a more actively restructured welfare system, which 
encourage[s] people to take risks, rather than stopping them from 
doing so‟ (1999:5).  Indeed, it is because Britain now has a „more 
active, reflective citizenry‟ that Third Way politics can succeed 
(Giddens 1999: 6).   
 
 
 
Giddens‟ acceptance that British citizens are generally active echoes 
Latham‟s assertion that, generally, Australians are increasingly self-
reliant.  However, unlike Giddens, Latham (2001a:9) also appears to 
endorse the view that Australians are experiencing a sort of social 
decline: „Across all demographic, geographic and income groups, 
Australia is experiencing a new type of poverty, the poverty in human 
relationships‟.   Yet, in terms of materially affluent citizens, civic 
impoverishment is attributed to a combination of unsafe public 
spaces and a lack of opportunity for civic engagement.  The civic 
capabilities of affluent, employed citizens are not in doubt: „the public 
is in search of meaningful participation, a chance to cut out the 
middleman and engage in acts of self-governance (Latham 2001a: 9, 
18).  On the other hand, Latham (2001a:9) assumes that poor 
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communities must be „normalised‟ in order for them to make rational 
use of the „the material gifts of government‟.    
 
This conflation of civic capability with material affluence can be 
largely attributed to Latham‟s endorsement of social capital theory.  
According to Latham, social justice is synonymous with the creation 
of social captial: horizontal social relationships that evolve through 
civic participation and nourish positive norms of reciprocity and trust.  
As with key social capital theorist, Robert Putnam (1993), Latham 
equates prosperity and social inclusion with the presence of social 
capital.  By extension, because poor communities are conceived as 
deficient in social capital  „the success of the welfare state relies 
heavily on the success of civil society‟ (Latham 2001a:9).  Therefore, 
although Latham believes there is an overall civic deficit in Australia, 
he tends to assume that relatively affluent, employed citizens are 
inherently capable of civic action.   
 
There are, arguably, two intertwined beliefs bound up in this 
assumption.  First, the welfare state undermines civic activity, and, by 
extension, the civic capability of citizens who rely on it.  Second, 
being employed is an adequate indicator of civic ability.  However, 
results of a recent study of cross-national volunteering patterns found 
no evidence that large welfare states were responsible for the 
weakening of civil society (Salamon & Sokolowski 2001: 21).  These 
findings are echoed in Bo Rothstein‟s paper on Sweden (a large 
universal welfare state), which concludes that, overall, social capital 
has increased since the 1950s (2001:16).   Instead, she argues that 
a more significant determinant of whether patterns of government 
provision encourage or undermine civil society may be whether they 
are universal or residual.  For instance, Rothstein asserts that the 
universal character of Sweden‟s welfare arrangements may have a 
positive affect on social trust, since they discourage the view that 
state provision exists only for the benefit of visible minority groups at 
the expense of the majority.  As with his preference for localised, 
residual income support policies, a continued focus on the problems 
and deficiencies of visible minorities allows Latham to overlook one 
significant difficulty faced by relatively affluent, employed Australians 
in the post-industrial era: that of excessive working hours.  This 
oversight may be detrimental to his intended aim of revivifying civil 
society. 
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Excessive Working Hours and Civic Participation 
 
Australian workers experience the second highest level of working 
hours within the OECD, with 32 per cent working more than 48 hours 
a week (Pocock et al, 2001a:8).  A recent report, funded by the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), on the effects of long 
working hours discerned a trend in which „extended family, sporting 
clubs and voluntary work‟ all fall by the wayside‟ (Pocock et al. 
2001b:34).3  According to the Report, workers interviewed have 
experienced a „time famine‟ where they cease doing things for 
themselves as individuals.  This narrowing of individual activity has 
had a significant effect in some communities: „Miners describe the 
decline of their local football club and golf club as a result of 
widespread shift work in their town‟ (Pocock et al. 2001b: 34).  
Others had to work hard to maintain their social connections, which 
they saw as an intrinsic aspect of their individual well-being: „being 
able to easily call on neighbours when called to work, for example, 
relied on a good community of neighbours and friends‟ (Pocock et al 
2001b: 34).  Apart from sporting activities and social connections, a 
number of those interviewed admitted to giving up voluntary work in 
social clubs, charities and the army reserve because of a lack of time 
and energy.  John Quiggin (2000: 8) concurs with this image, 
asserting that there is strong evidence to suggest that recent 
increases in working hours for full-time workers can be attributed to 
the increased bargaining powers of employers.  While money 
explains part of the motivation for working long hours, workers 
interviewed by Pocock et al also cite understaffing due to cost-
cutting, commitment to the job and job protection (Pocock et al 
2001a: 8; Pocock 2001:4). Third Way theorists, such as Latham, who 
concern themselves largely with the potential damage to the social 
fabric caused by unemployed „free riders‟ and apparently dystopic 
communities ignore the civic participation levels of affluent, employed 
citizens.  If these are low, then exhorting a minority of disadvantaged 
individuals and their communities to be more civic-minded will not 
improve the social and economic well-being of the majority.  Yet, as I 
have already suggested, Latham‟s oversight may derive from 
uncritical acceptance of the social capital thesis, which equates 
material affluence with civic health. 
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Juliet Schor (1997:8-11) challenges Putnam‟s evidence that there is 
a correlation between hours of work and civic engagement.  She 
points out that it can only tell us that some individuals are generally 
more active; it cannot show whether, for any given individual, working 
increases civic engagement.  In her own survey, Schor concludes 
that hours of work have risen in the US, particularly for highly 
educated, highly paid women: a group for whom civic engagement 
has fallen most significantly.  Schor‟s findings echo those of the Fifty 
Families report by Pocock et al, particularly in her contention that the 
rise in time pressure for affected groups is linked to the growth of 
unemployed and underemployed groups: citizens for whom the main 
barrier to civic participation is financial.  Consequently, it is possible 
that effective government policy solutions for the promotion of a more 
civil society might be found by looking at the nexus of 
underemployment and overwork. 
 
Such strategies might be presented as a type of universal welfare 
policy.  As an example, advocates of a government initiative in 
France to reduce weekly working hours to 35 claim to have attained 
shorter working hours, as well as creating a total of 300,000 new jobs 
between 1996-2001 (EIRO, 2002).  The advantage of such strategies 
is that they can be promoted as achieving increased levels of well-
being for workers and non-workers by more fairly redistributing 
available work.  Electrical workers interviewed by Pocock et al, 
whose union has instituted a cap on overtime, echo this 
interpretation: 
A number of interviewees mused on the work patterns that 
see so many working long hours, often reluctantly, in a labour 
market with high unemployment and under employment.  
Indeed, one of the main motivations for capping overtime 
amongst electricians in our study was the desire to „spread the 
work around‟ and even those who had lost money through the 
cap supported the logic of this…and the revival of their lives is 
powerful evidence in support of reigning in hours that some 
described as „relentless‟ or simply, „dangerous‟ (Pocock et al 
2001: 6). 
 
Treating what Schor (1997:11) refers to as the „bifurcation of the 
labor [sic] force‟ as a single phenomenon has the advantage in terms 
of gaining public support since it does not single out one highly 
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visible, stigmatised group of policy stakeholders.  Areas of social 
provision that are seen as universal, such as education and health, 
are far less politicised than means-tested residual programmes 
(Jamrozik 2001: 81; Quiggin 1997).  Quite apart from the negative 
outcomes of such programmes for current income support policy 
target groups, as potential recipients it is not ultimately in the best 
interests of the wider community to pursue coercive, authoritarian 
strategies, whatever the institutional design.  Furthermore, policies 
that reinforce community prejudices do nothing to address barriers to 
both civic participation and individual well-being.  Acknowledging the 
very real troubles of affluent, employed citizens is more likely to 
restore faith in collective provision.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Within Third Way theory, discussions about civic renewal and 
citizenship have enormous potential to revive community interest in 
social justice and community well-being.  To achieve this, however, 
advocates should focus on the barriers to the civic participation of all 
Australian communities, not just those that are economically 
disadvantaged.  Policies with a universal focus that promote civic 
renewal recognise that working citizens are not ipso facto good 
citizens in the civic sense.  In the same vein, advocates for civic 
renewal must also take care to ensure that policy proposals are not 
based on the assumption that disadvantaged citizens are uniquely 
responsible for the decline in Australian collectivism.  Neither is there 
any substantive basis for Latham‟s assumption that the prior 
institutional arrangements of income support programmes, such as 
unemployment benefits, have undermined the capacity of citizens to 
meet their civic obligations.  The broad expectation has always been 
that, as part of their entitlement to income support, unemployed 
Australians should attempt to find work.  Within this framework, the 
major barrier to civic participation is a lack of economic, rather than 
moral, resources.  Even so, the ACTU Fifty Families report makes it 
clear that linking formal employment with civic activism is 
problematic, particularly where working hours are excessive. 
 
Latham‟s suggested policy proposals, which aim to increase the civic 
participation of middle-class social entrepreneurs by devolving state 
services to the community level, do nothing to address the issue of 
overwork among employed Australians.  Instead, by reinforcing a 
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residual welfare philosophy that incorrectly divides Australians into 
eternal contributors and eternal receivers of state benefits, Latham 
reproduces a conceptual pattern that itself undermines the logic of 
collective provision.  It represents working citizens as universally 
capable, requiring no help, whereas poor, non-working citizens are 
represented as universally incapable, requiring ever-increasing moral 
scrutiny and suasion.  Instead, individual and community exposure to 
the vicissitudes of the market, in all its forms, should be treated as a 
universal experience, since this is more likely to reinstate broad 
support for collective provision.  The French experiment in 
implementing a 35-hour week represents one possible response to 
the challenge of providing citizens with increased opportunities for 
civic engagement, whether they are jobless and economically poor, 
or overworked and time-poor. 
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